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THE PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ADVOCATE
Logan Ford* and James H. Holmes, IIft
I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE technological advancement of this country during the past

three decades has tremendously enhanced the standard of living,
contributed to the military strength, and generally resulted in
scientific accomplishments heretofore unparalleled. Utilization of
nuclear power, space exploration, modern transportation and communication media, continued industrial development, increasing
demand upon the construction and building trades, and expanding
production and manufacturing outputs have affected all segments
of our way of life.' One of the concomitants of this technological
advancement, which is of particular significance to the personal injury lawyer, is that the human being is increasingly exposed and
subjected to the risk of bodily injury.' If injury does occur and the
parties are unable to settle, the injured party generally seeks relief
and requital from the tortfeasor through the medium of litigation. Personal injury accidents constitute the overwhelming majority
of all docketed civil matters' with a resulting tremendous monetary outlay in compensating the aggrieved victims.' Some writers
have noted a general trend toward an expansion of tort liability'
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist

University.
"Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. B.B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
"'The frontiers of the future lie invitingly ahead before us. We are in the era of
scientific and technological discovery, all holding promise of contribution to the national
welfare." Silverman, We Must Broaden Our Scope, 61 Com. L.J. 89 (1956).
"We shall add to our prestige and assume the place which is properly ours by adding new
and lasting materials to that marvelous industrial structure of which our country is
justly so proud." Id. at 90. Taubenfeld, Nuclear Testing e5 International Law, 16 Sw.
L.J. 365 (1962).
"It is estimated that there are approximately one and one-half million auto accidents
and two million industrial accidents annually in this country.
Sherbok, The Expert
Witness, 31 Dicta 375 (1954).
a Personal injury cases constitutes 75% of the litigation in the courts of the country.
" Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1959). "Approximately
75-80% of cases awaiting trial are personal injury cases.
Levy, Impartial Medical
Testimony, 30 Pa. B.A.Q. 348 (1959). "Since almost 90% of the civil cases in the city's
courts are personal injury actions ..
" Botein, The New York Medical Expert Testimony
Project-And Its Results To Date, 5 La. B.J. 15, 16 (1957).
"'In a recent year as a nation, we spent almost 4 billion in compensating victims of
personal injury accidents." Conrad & Voltz, The Economics of Injury Litigation, 39 Mich.
So. B.J. 32 (1960).
"'The general trend has been toward an expansion of tort liability, a broadened concept
of social responsibility, and a balancing of interests, with the latter often being measured
in terms of capacity to bear the loss." Rassman, Of Torts and Defendants, 16 Sw. L.J. 244
(1962); Survey, Personal Injury Damage Award Trends, 10 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 193-312
(1961).
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which, apparently, has been motivated by the public's increased
claim consciousness.' Although this may be true, a party's right to
utilize every available process within our judicial structure to redress a wrong or establish a claim is firmly entrenched within our
legal system, and no party should be condemned for instituting bona
fide litigation.!
It is common sense that the facts most favorable to the respective
causes advanced will be espoused during a lawsuit. This concept of
adversary litigation forms the foundation of our legal system.' Moreover, personal injury litigation has fostered the adversary system to
a large degree. In seeking to establish the extent of damage in a personal injury action, it is generally incumbent upon the parties to
solicit the assistance of various members of the medical profession.
This sphere of testimony truly epitomizes the functioning of the
adversary system because the opinions of medical experts may frequently confuse the jurors. Thus, the jury verdict often results from
partisan advocacy utilizing two extremes of medical opinion.
Some courts and writers are of the opinion that this class of evidence is the most unsatisfactory and unreliable part of judicial administration.' For example, the Illinois Supreme Court succinctly
stated in Opp v. Pryor"' that the problem is a result of opinionated
response to a pecuniary stimulus and, too often, the natural and ex"'In addition, there has developed in the last decade an increased claim consciousness
on the part of the American people. A general feeling has grown up that if something
happens to injure a person or his property, someone else ought to pay for it, regardless of
whether the injured person might have caused the damages himself." Knepper, The Automobile in Court, 17 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 213, 216 (1960).
' "The plaintiff is entitled to his day in court and is not to be condemned for invoking
the processes of the court." Rassman, supra note 3, at 248.
s"The Anglo-American adversary system is successful, to a large extent, because it is
based upon the imperfect nature of man-a Christian concept. That is, an imperfect man
may do anything to remain out of prison or to win a civil action. Therefore, there must
be two men in our system, one on each side, who tend to keep one another in check."
Nuss, The Christian Lawyer, 16 Sw. L.J. 262, 275 (1962).
'"When considering a motion for a new trial, based on an excessive verdict, ordinarily
but little weight should be given to evidence of the professional medical expert." Murphy
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 292 Pa. 213, 140 Atl. 867, 869 (1927). As stated by the court of
appeals of Kentucky: "That the testimony of experts is frequently colored probably unconsciously, by bias and partianship, is recognized by the courts, and it is for that reason
that they accord to it less weight than is given to other types of evidence." Agsten v. BrownWilliamson Tobacco Corp., 272 Ky. 20, 113 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1938). "Under present
procedure, where the medical testimony comes from no objective or necessarily qualified
source, and only through the hirelings of the parties, partisan experts, medical mouthpieces, the jury is more apt to be confused than enlightened by what it hears. It hears
black from one expert, white from the other, a maximizing or minimizing of injuries in
accordance with the interest of the source of payment for the testimony." Peck, supra
note 3, at 22.
'° 2 P4 Ill.538, 545, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920),
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pected outcome of the doctor's employment. One writer stated:
The regular court experts not only come to be tagged in courts as
'plaintiffs' experts or as 'defendants' experts, but they come in their
practice more or less unconsciously to get into a chronic one-sided
medical point of view. Habitually, the plaintiff's expert sees or magnifies injuries, symptoms and resultant ill effects which the defendant's
experts minimize or 'pooh pooh' altogether. The plaintiff's expert has
argued and reasoned himself into a frame of mind that sees in the given
case just what the plaintiff's attorney needs. On the other hand, the
defendant's expert sees a malingerer in every man who asks damages.
It is the old story of bringing to the market what the market demands."

Although most doctors, if called upon to testify, adhere to the
strict ethical standards of their profession, there are those whose conduct and lack of adherence to the established ethical norms leave an
indelible stigma on the entire group. The latter have earned the
title of "medical mouthpiece,"'" or, if you will, the "professional
medical advocate." The professional medical advocate is retained for
his testimonial ability in specifically influencing the outcome of litigation; usually, he presents a plausible diagnosis based on half truth
in such a manner that his finality of utterance is more convincing
than his medical knowledge or scientific veracity.
It is indeed tragic that the results of a substantial number of
cases are based upon evidence recognized to be unsavory and unsatisfactory. Theories have been propounded and suggestions made
in attempting to purge personal injury litigation of this impediment.
In some jurisdictions, courts have the power to appoint or call expert witnesses in their respective fields of medicine from a panel
chosen by the leaders of medical societies, bar associations, and the
judiciary.'3 Some have criticized such a procedure because it detracts
from the functioning and principles of the adversary system; others
believe that it is a satisfactory method of resolving the medical testimony entanglement.' 4 It is not the purpose of this Article to argue
the pros and cons of the medical panel, committee plan, or required
physical examinations because the lawyer must operate under the
procedural aspect of the law as it exists in Texas. In workmen's compensation cases involving occupational diseases, the Texas courts have
the power to appoint a medical committee of three doctors to examine
"1 Friedman, Expert Testimony,

(1910).

Its Abuses and Reformation, 19 Yale L.J. 247, 253

12See note 9 supra.
13Peck, supra note 3; McCormick, Science, Experts and the Courts, 29 Texas L. Rev.
611, 624 (1951).
14Levy, supra note 3; cf. Peck, supra note 3.
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the claimant and submit a report in open court."' Also, the Industrial
Accident Board may require an employee to submit to an examination. Furthermore, if the employee or insurance carrier requests, he
is entitled to have a doctor of his own selection present to participate
in the examination." Since there is no provision for medical committees, panels, or required physicals in the litigation of bodily injury
cases in Texas except as heretofore mentioned, presentation of expert
medical testimony in its most credible form must be made within
the boundaries of the evidentiary rules. One of the best tools of the
trial advocate's trade in testing the credibility of an adversary's expert medical witness is cross-examination. If confronted during the
trial with a professional medical advocate, much can be done from an
impeachment standpoint merely by revealing that the witness is a
professional expert.
II. SCOPE OF CROss-EXAMINATION

In challenging or testing the credibility of a witness, it is recognized in Texas"7 and other jurisdictions" that the extent of examination rests within the discretion of the trial judge. His ruling on such
matters does not constitute grounds for reversal unless an abuse of
discretion is found by the reviewing court. In a majority of jurisdictions, the discretionary function is vividly defined because crossexamination is limited to matters elicited from the witness on direct
examination. Under the majority concept, however, it would certainly appear that a party would not be limited to testing the credibility of an expert witness solely on the basis of his expertise and
§ 13(g) (1956), states:
Where a case of occupational disease is pending in any court of this state,
upon the motion of either party, or upon its own motion, the court shall
appoint a Medical Committee consisting of three (3) doctors duly qualified
in the diagnosis and treatment of occupational diseases and licensed to practice
in the state, and shall direct the employee to submit to examination, including
clinical and X-ray examination, as the Medical Committee may require or deem
advisable. The Medical Committee shall report its findings and conclusions in
open court, and such may be rebuttable. The court shall pass on the reasonableness of the fees, costs, and other expenditures of the Medical Committee,
which fees shall be taxed as costs.
0
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307, § 4 (1959).
17 "The matter of cross-examination, including the conduct and extent thereof, being
left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, his ruling will not be disturbed if not
arbitrarily and unreasonably made." Varnado v. City of Groves, 329 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Garza, 308 S.W.2d 521
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Story v. Partridge, 298 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957) error Yef. n.r.e.
"SEvansville City Coach Line v. Roger, 122 Ind. App. 119, 99 N.E.2d 435 (1951);
Madsen v. Obermann, 237 Iowa 461, 22 N.W.2d 350 (1946); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226
Minn. 106, 32 N.W.2d 291 (1948); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 621 (1948).
1958 Am. Jur. Witnesses § 627 (1948).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307,
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qualifications, which most assuredly would be developed on direct
examination or stipulated.
Texas does not require a party to confine questions on cross-examination entirely to matters brought out on direct."0 Moreover, it is generally stated that cross-examination may properly extend to any matter relevant to the issues between the parties. 1 In defining the permissible scope of cross-examination of an expert witness, the rules are liberalized not only as to the relevancy of the issues between the parties,
but also as to matters touching on the credibility of the expert." The
credibility of any witness revolves around the "stock that may be put
in his testimony"; generally, he may be attacked through examination as to bias, interest, hostility or prejudice, qualifications, knowledge of facts and defects, or limitations in perception. In questioning
a medical expert, the cross-examiner should direct his attack toward
the factors of bias, interest, and prejudice exemplified by the expert's reputation for testifying. The position of the hireling and his
interest in the litigation can best be disclosed to the court and jury
in this manner. Cross-examination in the following areas will achieve
the result of exposing a professional witness; it should be noted,
however, that questions pertaining to opinions rendered while testifying in other lawsuits are neither admissable nor the proper subject
of cross-examination:
1. The number of times the witness has testified for an attorney who
is involved in the litigation;
2. The number of times the witness has testified for a particular party
to the litigation or his connection with a particular party to the litigation;
3. The number of times the witness has testified generally;
4. The fees received for testifying in past litigation or the case at bar.
A. Number Of Times The Witness Has Testified For An Attorney
Who Is Involved In The Litigation
As early as 1907, in the case of Horton v. Houston & T.C. Ry.,n
a Texas court permitted the cross-examination of a doctor as to the
number of times he had testified for the attorney who represented
0

' Preston State Bank v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 320 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958). The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals stated, "that in Texas an adversary in
his cross-examination is not limited to matters covered by direct examination." Id. at 187,
citing Rhine v. Blake, 59 Tex. 240 (1883) and Wentworth v. Crawford, 11 Tex. 64

(1853).
" Grocers Supply Co. v. Stuckey, 152
w.O.M.
22See note 21 supra; Texas Employers'
App. 1945), affirmed., 144 Tex. 432, 191
Johnson, 285 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.
0 103 S.W. 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907)

S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951)

error ref.

Ins. Ass'n v. Hale, 188 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ.
S.W.2d 472 (1946); Barton Plumbing Co. v.
1955) error ref.
error ref.
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the claimant. The appellant in the Horton case assigned as error
the latitude allowed appellee's attorney in the cross-examination of
the doctor called to testify as to the extent of the claimant's injuries.
In an effort to show interest and bias on the part of the physician,
counsel asked if he had previously testified for claimants in other
damage suits in which the appellant's attorneys represented the plaintiffs. The court stated: "Certainly on cross-examination counsel
should have been permitted to ask such questions as if answered in
the affirmative would have shown that the doctor had been habitually
called by plaintiff's attorney. . . ."' Subsequently, in St. Louis &
S.F. Ry. v. Clifford," the court acknowledged the decision in the
Horton case although appellee's counsel did not attempt to prove
such facts and the court did not rule directly on the admissability of
such testimony. In a more recent decision," the court of civil appeals
also acknowledged the validity of this type of cross-examination when
it stated:
The argument with respect to Dr. Falkenstein's presence then as a
witness being due to his respect for the truth was a reasonable and
proper deduction from the obvious attempt on the part of appellant
to portray the doctor to the jury as a witness interested in helping
appellee's counsel .. .by having testified for him in many cases.
Courts of other jurisdictions have also adjudged such examination
to be within the realm of the credibility of the witness and properly
admissible." For example, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Virginia
Linen Service v. Allen,2 ' was requested to set aside a verdict on the
grounds of after-discovered evidence. The request was based upon
information that the plaintiff's doctors had participated in four
damage suits in 1955 prior to the then present suit and one thereafter with the firm representing the plaintiff, in which they testified
or were prepared to testify as plaintiff's witnesses. In overruling the
motion to set the verdict aside, the court held that evidence of the
relationship alleged could have been admitted only to impeach the
24

Id. at 469.

148 S.W. 1163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
24Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Johnson, 323 S.W.2d 345

21

(Tex. Civ. App.

1959)

error ref. n.r.e.
2Id. at 351.
s The propriety of eliciting the fact that a witness has testified in other cases for the
party for whom such witness testifies in the case at bar has been recognized. A similar rule
has been recognized as to the cross-examination of a physician as a witness for plaintiff in
an action for personal injuries, in respect of testimony by such physician in other actions
in which he was called as a witness by the attorney for plaintiff in the present action.
See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 560 (1957); 70 C.J. Witnesses § 1188 (1935).
29 198 Va. 700, 96 S.E.2d 86 (1957).
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character and discredit the testimony of the doctors. The court
further stated:
It would serve the interests of the medical profession and aid in maintaining its high standards if doctors who testify would heed the admonition recently given by a member of their profession, that they avoid
allowing themselves to be labeled a plaintiff's doctor or a defendant's
doctor, and to remember at all times that he is a witness and not an
advocate." °
B. Number Of Times The Witness Has Testified For A Particular
Party Involved In The Litigation Or His Connection With
A ParticularParty To The Litigation
In Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Dempsey,3' the court was confronted with the propriety of cross-examination as to the extent of
business dealings between the doctor and the insurer. The court
stated:
Our courts have held on numerous occasions that 'it is competent, on
the cross-examination of a witness, to elicit facts which tend to show
the bias, prejudice, or friendship of the witness for the party for whom
he testifies, and to show hostility toward the party against whom he is
called.' . . . The appellee was attempting to do no more than to show

that Dr. Dupre had an interest in the result of the trial or, at least, to
show that he had a connection with the appellant which, unconsciously
or otherwise, could materially affect the weight to be given his testimony."
Moreover, in a personal injury action arising from a train wreck, the
appellee in Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Bell" established that a medical witness was and had been the local surgeon of the railway for one year."
The doctor called as a witness by the defendant in Metropolitan St.
Ry. v. Houghton" testified on cross-examination that "at the time
of the alleged injury I represented the three street railway companies here, the Metropolitan, Rapid Transit, and Consolidated. I am
subject to call in cases of this kind if the street car companies think
30 Id. at 91.
3' 232 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.
3

Civ. App. 1950)

1d. at 119.
33 93 Tex. 632, 58 S.W. 614 (1900).

error ref. n.r.e.

The court overruled appellant's assigned error on
this point but did not comment. The implication arises from this decision that questions
may be propounded which evidence a doctor's tendency to testify on one side of the docket
or the other and for a certain party. If this implication is not justifiable, the rule is
supported by the decision in Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Dempsey, 232 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
' Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Bell, 93 Tex. 632, 634, 58 S.W. 614, 621 (1900).
35134 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) error ref. The case was reversed because of
the exception to the ruling of the trial court in disallowing counsel for the appellant to
rehabilitate the doctor on redirect by setting forth that more cases are settled by appellant
on the witness' recommendation than are litigated.
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my testimony important. I do testify for the defendant in a great
many cases. I testify the truth as nearly as I can.""0 No objection was
taken to such examination; however, the appellate court inferentially
approved the interrogation, for it stated that the testimony "was
evidently brought out to show a hostility on the part of the witness
to plaintiff's case, and a bias on his part in favor of the railroad company. '
The decisions of the courts of other states lend analogous support
to this line of examination. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that
cross-examination to test the credibility of a medical witness is not restricted by the cases to utilization against the medical expert. Any
expert whose character as such is subject to impeachment and whose
testimony is not above disrepute is the proper subject for such examination. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld questions addressed to
expert engineers on cross-examination, the answers to which revealed
that they had been used frequently and principally as expert witnesses by the appellant and other such companies."8 The Supreme
Court of Alabama, in a stream pollution case involving damage to
riparian properties, held that the trial court should have allowed the
cross-examination of appellee's expert which tended to establish that
the witness had testified for appellee in other cases of a similar character and relating to the same stream."' In a case which did not involve the testimony of an expert witness, the Vermont Supreme
Court nevertheless allowed counsel to elicit from the witness that
this was not the first time he had testified in behalf of the defendant.'
An Oregon case, involving the appropriation of land by the Oregon
Highway Commission, permitted inquiry into the number of times
the appraiser had testified previously for the Highway Commission.
The court found the examination to be proper and commented on
the bias inherent in expert testimony as a whole.41 Three Illinois
Supreme Court cases indicate that counsel may establish the number
'lid.
37

at 423.
Ibid.

"sSt. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S.W. 115

(1914).

a" Jones v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. 202 Ala. 381, 80 So. 463 (1918).
4The court stated: "The plaintiff was permitted to show in the cross-examination of
an adverse witness, that it was not the first time he had testified in behalf of the defendant.
Nothing more appears regarding the matter. It was within the discretion of the court to
permit the inquiry." Wellman v. Carpenter, 86 Vt. 490, 86 Atl. 497 (1913).
41 "More latitude is permitted in the cross-examination of expert witnesses than is the
case with ordinary witnesses, because expert testimony is viewed with some suspicion. The
natural bias which the expert may have in favor of the party who employed and is paying
him is the chief cause for the discredit that has been cast upon expert testimony as a
whole." State v. Superbilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707, 713 (1955).
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of times a witness has testified for a particular party in similar cases'
and the number of cases in which the witness has testified for similar
parties.'"
C. Number Of Times The Witness Has Testified Generally
Although the courts have upheld the propriety and relevancy of
cross-examination that discloses the number of times that the witness
has testified generally, it would seem that this would not be as
damaging from an impeachment standpoint as the previous examples of interrogation unless it can be shown that the witnesses'
testimony is habitually received in behalf of either plaintiffs or
defendants. This conclusion is based upon the assumption that
a jury would be reasonably justified in not inferring bias or prejudice in the testimony of the witness if his former experience in
testifying has been from both sides of the docket. Such a status
would lend objectivity to his analysis or diagnosis and reflect a
lesser degree of partisanship than would be present if he had previously testified on numerous occasions for the attorney of the plaintiff or a particular party to the controversy. In Young v. Texas
& Pac. Ry.," counsel for plaintiff attempted to cross-examine the
defendant's medical witness as to the number of cases in which
he had testified and on the point that on those occasions he consistently denied the plaintiff's injury. Objection to the examination was lbdged by the defendant and sustained by the trial court,
to which ruling the plaintiff alleged error. The record expressly disclosed that the witness testified extensively as to his relation with
the appellee and, further, that he had testified for plaintiffs as well
as defendants. The court held that from the testimony the doctor's
position was before the jury and that they were qualified to pass on
any question of bias or prejudice. It would appear that if the question
had been restricted to the realm of the number of times the witness
had testified and had not queried the diagnosis on those occasions, it
would have been error to preclude the question and answer; but
whether it would have constituted grounds for reversal is less likely,
especially in view of the completeness of the doctor's testimony regarding his relation with appellee. However, as will be discussed later,
medical witnesses' professional opinions given while testifying in
other lawsuits are not admissible and thus would render the courts
ruling valid as to the latter part of the question.
"'City of Chicago v. Van Schaack Bros. Chemical Works, 330 I11. 264, 164 N.E. 486,
490 (1928); Plambeck v. Chicago Ry., 294 I1. 302, 128 N.E. 513 (1920).
43McMahon v. Chicago City Ry., 239 Ill. 302, 88 N.E. 223, 225 (1909).
44347 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 17

The appropriateness of a portion of plaintiff counsel's argument
to the jury in a workmen's compensation case was before the court
in Transport Ins. Co. v. Cossaboon." The comments in argument
centered around the testimony of one of the appellant's medical
witnesses. The attorney stated, "Had he heard? Had heard of the
clientele that Dr. Gault had built up of representing 184 insurance companies?" ' The court of civil appeals held: "All things
considered, the trial court must have had some reason for making the statement he did in answer to the objection, in which the
trial court pointed out that attorneys have a right to make reasonable
deductions from the testimony of witnesses. The point is overruled." 7
From the foregoing comment of the trial court, it can certainly be
concluded that the doctor's character as a witness had been aired
during the trial, upon which counsel indulged in reasonable comment. If an attorney is properly allowed comment on a doctor's background in closing argument, assuming it to be before the court and
jury, then it would be no less proper to permit cross-examination as
to his partisanship. A case squarely on point in this area is Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Robinson," which holds that it is permissible to
establish through cross-examination the number of times a medical
witness has testified for plaintiffs. In the Robinson case, appellant
was allowed to elicit on cross-examination from the appellee's
medcial witness the fact that he had testified for plaintiffs in
numerous injury actions in approximately twelve cities throughout the state. The appellate court, in acknowledging the permissibility of such interrogation, stated: "It is the settled law of
this state that a party to a suit has the right to cross-examine an adverse witness in order to show interest, bias, or prejudice to affect his
credibility and a wide latitude is allowed in such matters."'" Two
other Texas cases concur in authorizing the extension of cross-examination of an adverse expert witness to the number of times he has
testified for plaintiffs" and to the point in time when the witness last
testified for a plaintiff in a damage suit. 1
In turning to authorities of other jurisdictions, it is indeed interesting to review five decisions handed down by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on petitions of excessive verdicts. In these cases, de4 291

S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
" Id. at 748.
41Id. at 749.
4' 222 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref.
4
Id. at 269.
50Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Stewart, 164 S.W. 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.
"San Angelo Water, Light & Power Co. v. Baugh, 270 S.W. 1101, 1104 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925) error dism.
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cided over a period of approximately twenty years, the court readily
acknowledged the partisan character and bias inherent in the testimony of one particular doctor. Beginning with Murphy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 2 the court stated: "The professional expert, whose testimony we relate above, frequently appeared in court as a witness in personal injury cases, and the inference from his evidence
is that he made the giving of testimony in such actions a business."53
Following this decision three interim cases ensued, two of which
verdicts were held to be excessive based on the failure of the jury
to properly scrutinize this doctor's testimony,"4 and the other granting a new trial based on the lack of credible medical testimony in the
plaintiff's behalf."5 Finally, in Libengood v. Pennsylvania R.R.,"
the court stated: "The jury's error on the side of excessiveness
may be attributed to their too ready acceptance of the testimony of
the plaintiff's medical expert without giving it the especially careful
scrutiny to which it should have been subjected as this court has
heretofore cautioned upon a number of occasions. . . ."" In a more
recent decision, a lower Pennsylvania court" ascribed to the view
that it is permissible for defendant's counsel to cross-examine the
expert medical witness of the plaintiff as to the number of recent
personal injury actions in which he had testified for plaintiffs. The
ruling rested on the premise that any evidence upon which a logical
inference such as bias may be based will be received in the absence
of some specific rule excluding it.
Even though it is clear that evidence of this nature may be drawn
from an expert witness, the phraseology of the questions should be
reviewed in cases arising in federal courts in order not to fall within
the decisions of Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez5 and thus preclude
the interrogation because of indefiniteness and remoteness.

D. Fees Received For Testimony In Litigation
In attempting to convince the jury that an expert witness, medical
52292 Pa. 213, 140 Atl. 867 (1927).
53
id.at 867.
,'Doran v. Pittsburgh Ry., 343 Pa. 204, 22 A.2d 826, 829 (1941); Tauber v. Borough
of Wilkinsburg, 309 Pa. 331, 163 Atd. 675 (1932).
" "In order to supply the deficiency in their proof as to the cause of the abortions,

plaintiffs called a professional expert witness, who had been testifying in the courts of
Allegheny County as an expert for thirty years.
...Nickolls v. Personal Fin. Co.,
322 Pa. 67, 185 Ati. 286, 287 (1936).
56358 Pa. 7, 55 A.2d 756 (1947).
7 Id. at 759.
Kelly v. Pittsburgh Rys., 95 Pitt. Legal J. 437 (C.P. 1947).
5 The question asked by counsel, to which the objection sustained, was, "Do you make
it a habit of appearing for plaintiffs
in these personal injury cases?"4 F.2d 215, 218
(9th Cir. 1925). But Texas authorities appear to allow thislineof interrogation. See notes
44, 45, 48, 50 supra.
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or otherwise, is a professional testifier, examination as to the fees
charged in past cases should not be overlooked; such interrogation
indirectly reveals the number of times an expert has taken the witness
stand. Cases are in conflict in Texas as to revealing the remuneration
an expert received for testimony given in prior lawsuits. The court,
in the Horton case, 60 permitted counsel to establish that the physician testifying for the plaintiff was compensated in prior cases contingent upon the recovery of damages. A relatively recent decision

involving condemnation matters likewise held permissible the crossexamination of an expert appraiser from the standpoint of fees
charged for testifying in other condemnation cases for the Housing
Authority of the City of Dallas. "1 Contrary decisions have been
rendered by courts in St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Clifford" and Gulf
C. &. S.F. Ry. v. Ste-wart."' In the latter cases, it was held that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit evidence
tending to show the doctor's custom regarding his fees for testifying
in previous cases. However, the doctor's relationship with the plaintiff in the Clifford case was adequately and fully covered, probably instilling the belief in the court that the trial judge's ruling
was not unreasonable. In the Stewart case, the court merely voiced
the opinion that such matters are immaterial, but readily conceded
that the inquiry would have been relevant to the issues in the principal case. If the language of the Horton case, dealing with fees
charged in past litigation, cannot be relied upon as authority in this
area, it would appear to be a very thin line of distinction to allow
such cross-examination of an appraiser in a condemnation case and
foreclose the procedure to counsel when cross-examining a doctor in
personal injury litigation.
E. Opinions Rendered While Testifying In Other Lawsuits
In cross-examination as to opinions rendered in other lawsuits,
as in the area of remuneration, the opportunity would appear to
be present to indirectly elicit the number of times a witness has
testified; the number of opinions rendered would be commensurate to the number of times he has appeared at the courthouse. Although the courts will permit counsel to develop the
number of times an expert has rendered an opinion for one party
or another, they are reluctant to allow counsel to pursue or develop the basis, text, or contents of such previous opinions in
60 103 S.W. 467, 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.
61 City of Dallas v. Riddle, 325 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)

62 148 S.W. 1163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
63 164 S.W. 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.

error ref. n.r.e.
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testing the expert's credibility. Again, the Horton case" is authority for disallowing impeachment evidence which inquires into the
correctness of the doctor's opinions given in previous damage suits.
Moreover, in the Robinson case,"' the court held that the appellant's attorney could not question appellee's doctor as to previous
reports made to the Industrial Accident Board setting forth specific
injuries identical to or of the same general nature alleged by the
plaintiff. The rationale of the ruling is abundantly clear because
cross-examination would be unduly prolonged and involve matters
of questioned relevancy and materiality.
III. CONCLUSION

It is readily apparent that the scope of cross-examination is highly
discretionary with the trial court, but even in this area the function
becomes axiomatic when judicial precedents light the way for the
exercise of discretion. Trial counsel should not overlook the means
at his disposal to reveal the true character of the professional medical
advocate or any expert who responds solely to a pecuniary stimulus
and disregards the ethics of human decency.
The adversary system itself has done much to crush fraud and
imposition;6 however, a relatively few professional expert witnesses
continue to unethically influence litigation. Bar associations and medical societies throughout the country have recognized the problem as
it exists, and the Statements of Principles" which were adopted by
the State Bar of Texas, the Texas Association of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, and the Texas Medical Association evidence the
concern. The Honorable Meier Steinbrink has set forth the responsibilities of the medical witness as follows:
The medical expert witness ... must bend every effort towards the discharge of his duties in a manner that will reflect credit on himself and
on the great profession which he represents. He should never forget
that his testimony is given to instruct and inform the court and jury
with regard to some vital point in issue and it is no less important that
he approach the case wholly uncommitted in opinion than that the
jurors should. Any individual who contributes even in the slightest to
a relaxation of public confidence in the administration of justice commits a serious transgression against society. A physician who, under the
impetus of a more or less substantial retainer, refuses to abide by rules
laid down for us by the highest courts, cannot avoid the realization
that his conduct inflicts grave harm, not alone upon his profession, but
See note 60 supra.
asSee note 48 supra.
88 Smith, Law and Science, 19 Texas L. Rev. 414, 418 (1941).
e'26 Texas B.J., No. 1 (1963).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17

upon one of the most vital forces that makes for good governmentthe true adminsitration of justice. Perjury is a crime, but it is no less
wrong for a physician to exaggerate or minimize symptoms and conditions described, to relate wilfully a partial truth which prevents an
accurate appraisal by the jury or to confuse the issue by introducing
factors which have no scientific relevance to the subject litigated. As a
member of a learned and public calling, he must be governed by rules
which transcend the distinction between legal and moral wrongs. 8
If the ethical responsibilities set forth therein were adhered to by

the members of both professions, the human limitations of the practitioners would succumb to legal and moral right.

"8Steinbrink, The Medical Witness, 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 155, 157, 158 (1937).
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